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Dublin Sidelines Kallas, and Exposes Who Really Runs EU Foreign Policy

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5 min read
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News & Analysis
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Nov 16, 2026
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EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, left without a seat on Europe's Ukraine negotiating team at the Dublin summit, pictured during a 2025 visit to Italy. © Marco Zeppetella / European Union, CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons.
  • EU leaders in Dublin picked France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK, plus the presidents of the European Council and Commission, to speak for Europe in Ukraine peace talks. The EU's own foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, got no seat.
  • António Costa cited the treaties to claim the leaders-level role for himself, and Ursula von der Leyen declined to back her own vice-president.
  • The snub lands as capitals argue over folding parts of the EEAS into the Commission, and as the opening budget proposal would cut foreign policy and aid spending by 17% against the Commission's plan.

The EU spent the 2000s building a job designed to answer one question: who speaks for Europe? Last Friday in Dublin, the bloc's leaders answered it differently. Not the High Representative.

At the informal European Council, leaders agreed that Europe's team for any Ukraine peace talks will be drawn from five capitals, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Britain, alongside European Council President António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. They did not appoint a single envoy, despite calls for one from Kyiv, Washington and Moscow, and despite Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni pushing for one. Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief and a Commission vice-president, had openly sought the role. She did not get a specific place on the team.

A job description, rewritten in public

Kallas made her case before the summit in plain terms. "I am the one who represents Europe in foreign and security policy," she said, pointing to the June 2024 decision that gave her the post. She also took on the most common objection head-on: "I know the Russians don't want me, but do we decide who represents Russia?"

The answer from the institutions was cool. Costa responded by citing the EU treaties, which give the European Council president the external representation role at the level of heads of state and government. Von der Leyen declined to defend her vice-president, saying only that the leaders had decided. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the E3 format had proved itself and saw no need for an institutional debate.

Two objections run underneath. Some capitals see Kallas as too hawkish to sit across from Russian negotiators; she has previously talked of dismantling the Russian state. Others are protecting turf. France and Germany have spent this autumn pushing a plan to strengthen the High Representative's office while moving parts of the European External Action Service into the Commission, a proposal that has triggered exactly the kind of institutional jostling now on display.

Writing on his Substack the day after the summit, Brussels journalist Dave Keating did not soften it: "If I were her, I would resign rather than continue to participate in this EU farce." His wider point is harder to dismiss. If leaders do not trust the person they appointed to represent them on the biggest foreign policy question facing Europe, the problem is not one official. It is the design.

The wrong argument at the wrong moment

The representation fight also crowded out the substance. US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have widened the talks to include Europe's wider security architecture, a long-standing Kremlin demand. Russia's chief negotiator in Abu Dhabi called for "a new Yalta and Potsdam", and Moscow has floated non-aggression pacts with individual NATO members, which would gut the alliance's mutual defence promise. European leaders insist any such discussion must come after a ceasefire. Yet the week's energy in Dublin went on seating plans.

Kallas herself has argued for strict sequencing: ceasefire first, then a peace deal, then security arrangements. That is the European position. The irony is that the official whose job it is to state it will not be in the room to do so.

What Crisis Group warned a month ago

None of this would surprise the International Crisis Group. In "President's Take: Adapting EU Foreign Policy to a World of Recurring Crises", the opening essay of its EU Watch List 2026 – Autumn Edition published on 15 October, Crisis Group President Comfort Ero argued that the EU's foreign policy machinery needs repair if the bloc is to turn its collective weight into action.

The report backs wider use of qualified majority voting, noting that eleven member states signed a letter supporting it before August's informal foreign ministers' meeting, so a single capital can no longer block action to extract concessions elsewhere. It calls the Franco-German EEAS proposal a useful debate, with one condition: whatever structure emerges must keep the EU's diplomatic reach, staff and expertise intact.

Then comes the number that matters for the next fortnight. According to Crisis Group, the Council presidency's opening proposal for the 2028-2034 budget would cut EU foreign policy and development aid by 17% against the Commission's initial plan. The report says this weakens precisely the capacities, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and mediation, that Europe claims it wants. It also notes that since 2024 the bloc has signed twelve security and defence arrangements with partners worldwide, the kind of network that needs diplomats to run it.

What This Means

Dublin settled a seating question and opened a constitutional one. The EU now has a foreign policy chief who does not represent it in the most important negotiation on its own continent, and leaders who would rather improvise than either empower or replace her. That leaves Moscow and Washington free to pick which Europeans to take seriously. The next tests come quickly. Costa is due to table a new budget negotiating box on 21 November, ahead of an extraordinary leaders' budget summit later this month, and whether the foreign policy and aid line is restored will show whether "geopolitical Europe" is willing to pay for its diplomats. If it is not, the Kallas snub will look less like a personnel spat and more like a policy.

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