The elections held last weekend in Poland, Romania, and Portugal preserved the pro-European core of the European Union, yet simultaneously revealed an increasingly fragmented political landscape and a steady shift toward the right. While the composition of the European Council (EUCO) remains anchored in the mainstream, with Renew Europe gaining one additional seat (bringing its total to five) and the European People’s Party (EPP) consolidating its lead with twelve seats, centrifugal pressures on the political center are now unmistakable.
From the perspective of Brussels, the short-term institutional repercussions appear limited: no changes are anticipated among the sitting Commissioners as a direct result of these national elections. Nonetheless, unless the EU manages to deliver more tangible and coherent outcomes in areas such as economic growth and competitiveness, the medium-term trajectory of political fragmentation will likely intensify.
In Poland, the first round of the presidential election resulted in a narrow lead for Rafał Trzaskowski, the candidate of Civic Platform (affiliated with the EPP), who secured 31.4 percent of the vote. He was followed closely by Karol Nawrocki, supported by the Law and Justice party (PiS, aligned with the ECR), who obtained 29.5 percent. Nawrocki enters the second round as the de facto favorite, bolstered by the combined 21 percent vote share garnered by far-right candidates Sławomir Mentzen and Grzegorz Braun. Polling data indicate a statistical tie between the two frontrunners, with Trzaskowski at approximately 46 percent and Nawrocki at 44 percent, making undecided voters and turnout decisive factors.
Although the Polish presidency is largely symbolic, it holds significant power through the right to veto legislation—a tool frequently employed during periods of cohabitation. A Trzaskowski presidency would dissolve the current institutional deadlock and facilitate reforms aligned with EU objectives, particularly in the domains of the rule of law, climate policy, and support for Ukraine. Conversely, a Nawrocki victory would likely entrench institutional conflict and hinder progress on key reforms. The Polish left remains marginal, with roughly 10 percent of the vote, underscoring the importance of unifying the center-right space for the second-round outcome.
In Romania, independent candidate Nicușor Dan, broadly aligned with Renew Europe, prevailed in the second round of the presidential election with 54 percent of the vote, defeating George Simion of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR, ECR-affiliated), who received 46 percent. This result secures Romania’s pro-European trajectory and averts a reversal in the country’s strategic orientation toward EU enlargement, democratic standards, and its stance on Ukraine. Simion’s performance, however, cements AUR’s status as the principal opposition force and confirms the normalization of nationalist discourse.
The Romanian presidency plays an active role, particularly in foreign policy and participation in the European Council, rendering this electoral outcome strategically significant for the European Union. The governing coalition between the Social Democratic Party (PSD, S&D) and the National Liberal Party (PNL, EPP) remains intact but faces mounting pressure from the right and an increasingly disillusioned electorate. President Dan, unaffiliated with any political party, is likely to focus on enhancing the institutional standing of the presidency, prioritizing transparency, the rule of law, and European harmonization. Although no national elections are expected before 2028, the rise of AUR will shape Romania’s political trajectory in the run-up to the 2029 European elections.
In Portugal, the early general elections resulted in a victory for the Democratic Alliance (EPP), which secured 89 seats, falling short of the 116 required for an absolute majority. This marks the second early election in just over a year, following the failure of the previous EPP-led government to establish stability in March 2024. The Chega party (Patriots) surged to 58 seats, equalling the Socialist Party (PS, S&D), thereby disrupting the stability of Portugal’s post-revolution political system. Final results remain pending due to four diaspora seats, to be allocated on 28 May.
Despite Chega’s gains, Prime Minister Luís Montenegro has categorically ruled out any collaboration with the party. The Liberal Initiative (Renew) retained its eight seats, insufficient for a majority coalition with the EPP. The most plausible scenarios now involve either a fragile minority government or a broader centrist coalition involving the Socialists. Portugal’s seat in the European Council remains with the EPP, ensuring institutional continuity at the EU level. However, depending on the eventual composition of the government, there may be shifts in national policy on migration, energy, and fundamental rights. A governance model based on issue-specific alignments appears increasingly likely, unless the political system opts for a more structured centrist stabilization.
In conclusion, while these elections do not immediately alter the balance of power in Brussels, they reinforce the broader trend of political realignment and fragmentation across the European Union. The center-right continues to maintain control of the European Council, yet nationalist and populist forces are exerting growing influence over domestic political discourse in the member states. The EU’s capacity to deliver results in key areas such as growth, cohesion, and security will be crucial in countering these centrifugal dynamics and reinforcing democratic legitimacy across the Union.
