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When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly criticised the American war in Iran, Washington's response came fast. President Donald Trump threatened to raise tariffs on European cars from 15% to 25% — a number that directly violates the cap written into the Turnberry accord. Trump framed the move as a response to EU non-compliance with the deal, without specifying any objections.
The announcement, made on 1 May, follows a pattern that has become familiar. The Turnberry accord — named after Trump's Scottish golf course where it was signed in summer 2025 — was presented as a stabilising framework that would give European businesses the predictability they needed. It capped US auto tariffs at 15% and was touted by the European Commission as one of the deal's central achievements for the automotive sector.
But predictability has not been the result. Weeks after signing, Washington reclassified 407 categories of industrial products as steel derivatives and subjected them to 50% tariffs — a move that contradicted the letter and spirit of the agreement. Brinkmanship over Greenland followed. Now the auto sector ceiling itself is under threat.
The stakes for Germany are severe. German automakers — BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen — account for a disproportionate share of EU car exports to the United States. A jump from 15% to 25% would land on companies already navigating a difficult transition to electric vehicles and the partial loss of their Chinese market share. European Business Magazine has estimated the tariff could trigger a German recession.
Merz's Iran criticism was the stated trigger, but the underlying dynamic is structural: Trump treats the Turnberry framework as provisional, subject to revision whenever political impulses require. As Ian Hernandez of the European Policy Centre wrote in a recent analysis, "commitments are provisional, and escalation is never off the table."
The EU has tools. It retains significant market access leverage, and European producers supply technologies and components the US needs. But deploying those tools carries costs. It requires political consensus among 27 member states, including some with strategic interests in keeping Washington onside. The EPP, dominant in both the Parliament and several key governments, has shown little appetite for reopening negotiations or fundamentally challenging the deal.
The moment for a more assertive response may have already passed. Earlier this year, the US Supreme Court handed down a ruling on Trump's use of IEEPA authority that briefly opened a window — a legal opportunity that could have strengthened Europe's hand. European policymakers, Hernandez noted, failed to capitalise on it.
What remains is a narrow path between escalation and normalisation. Neither is comfortable. Retaliatory measures risk economic damage and member state splits. Passivity risks institutionalising what amounts to a structural subordination of EU trade interests to American political impulses.
The Turnberry accord was always a difficult deal — sold on the promise of stability it has consistently failed to deliver. The auto tariff threat is not an aberration; it is the operating logic of the relationship. Europe got a ceiling on auto tariffs, and Washington treats that ceiling as advisory.
The harder question is what comes next. European industry needs a predictable trade environment and is not getting one. The Commission has signalled it will respond firmly but has not said how. What is clear is that any deal with Washington that cannot be enforced in practice is not really a deal.
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